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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This

rutin!" ha;, j ur i sd i rt i on over this appeal oursuant to

Section 78-2-2 (1)(j ) of: Utah Code Annotated and Eiil e • of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED
I.

11 i a t: ::: i: !::: a c t a oi I, • :lc:> I J tal i Coi ir ts fo] 11 ow the doctri ne of

Lex I .oci Delicti where the injury occurred out of state?
I

I f t Jtah does f o ] 1 ow the doctr ine o f Lex Loc I De 1 i ct i ,
J

; ,r

s Wor k e i s Compel i s a t i oi i he t pr o \ r:i de ai l e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s

rule ?
111
*\ ] i ct i

f

If

Ut ah

doe s

not

£ o 1 1 ow

t he

i s p ] a i i I t :i f f s a c t i o i i s t :li ] ] b a r r e d

doct r i ne
I 11 i d e i:

o£

Le x

Lo c i

t he s ub s t a i I t i a 1

contacts or interests rule?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard

of review on appeal

Is to review the trial

• ::ourt' s conc 1 usI on of 1 aw £or correctness. Mountain Fu e 1 S upp 1 y v.
Salt Lake City, 7 52 I 2d 884 (1 J tal i 1 988)

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

Nevada

Revi sed

Statutes,

(attached as Exhibit --")

1

Section

61 6 , 2 7 0

(11 986) .

2.

Nevada

Revised

Statutes,

Section

616.085

(1986).

(attached as Exhibit "B")
3.

Nevada Revised Statutes, Section 616.260(1), (3) (1986).

(attached as Exhibit "C")
4.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-62, 1953 as amended,

(attached as Exhibit "D")
5.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-54, 1953 as amended,

(attached as Exhibit "E")
6.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-44, 1953 as amended,

(attached as Exhibit "F")
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case:

This action was brought by plaintiff under common-law tort
principles, for personal injuries he sustained while working on a
construction project in Nevada.

Contrary to plaintiff's assertion

and record citation, this action was not brought pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-62.
The owner of the project was the state of Nevada.
negligent act occurred in Nevada.

The injury occurred in Nevada.

Nevada was the center of the parties' relationship.
of

the

subcontractors, a third-party

corporation.

See R. 40, 106.

2

The alleged

At least one

defendant, was

a

Nevada

B.

Proceedings below:

This

in an appeal

from, final orders of the Third

Judicial

Di st i Let Coiii/i J n .in 1 leu .1 i I t. I a k e Coui i/t;;r , Sta te of I If al: i, be for e
the Honorable Pat B
2 6, 199] granti ng

Brian, District Cour t .3 udge, dated November
Layton's

Moti on to

Dismiss

and

Steel

Deck's

Mo t:i on for Si immary J I ldgmei it w hi cl: I were docketed "w i •
the District Court of Salt Lake County, St.^rc
the

same

date,

and

from

.

£

-:» - • ah on or about

all Rul'i.ss ctnu uiaeib

ui

that

court

affecting or pertaining to the rights claimed and asserted by the
plaintiff

(R. 321-325; 3 2 6 - 3 2 9 ) .

Defendants Layton and steel Deck are the only defenda
have been served and who bavp e n t p r ^ an appearance ^n
Defendant
Bu. i ] t -R

^ir

-fc.t

appearance

'mi

:* *

n : nt

orporat : r c:

i party

.1^ t third-party defendant

act]'-

, v^a.i

(j ia i nt i * '
is not

J--

as
1

third-party

Christense
successc:

i-j .

;,.., ..i'lU:. .

'

served ana entered
underlying

^GU< I uro

o

cought

^ *

company

-; t--ir-

;e,i^v^u

i

appeal

*

defendant, is a Utah corporation.

3

against

Concrete. rt.-. *

-

-r,t*-ti

*

*

the

the

:r.: -iqhar,
: :

a.3.

the

:

-

a tnird-party

t

Hearing on Layton's Motion to Dismiss and Steel Deck's Motion
for Summary Judgment was held before the Honorable Pat B. Brian,
Third District Court Judge, on November 8, 1991.

Prior to the

hearing, Layton and Steel Deck submitted memoranda in support of
their respective motions.

Shaw submitted memoranda in opposition

to each of the motions.

The court permitted oral argument and

thereafter issued its Memorandum Decision, containing its Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and its Order dated November 26, 1991
granting both Motions and dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint (R. 110120A; 121-138; 139-149; 165-174; 193-194; 195-237; 242-254; 256272; 321-329).
This matter was previously on appeal as evidenced by a Notice
of Appeal filed December 26, 1991 (R. 345-46).

This court, on its

own

grounds

motion,

dismissed

that

appeal

on

the

that

the

plaintiff-appellant had not obtained certification of the Orders of
dismissal as final judgments as required by Rule 54(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

As a result, that appeal

(Case No.

920685-CA) was dismissed without prejudice.
Based on a motion and stipulation, the parties to this matter
obtained a certification from the trial court as required by Rule
54(b) which was dated July 8, 1993.

A Notice of Appeal was filed

by the plaintiff with the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah on July 20, 1993. This case is now
4

before thIs court for cons iderat ioi 1 of the Issues raIsed by that
appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1

Plaintiff claims he was injured I n a construction accident

while working on a project * . L
E] y

Ne\ ada
2.

(R

. . -. Nevada state penitentiary in

1 22) .

At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was employed as

a bri ck-layer for I iar M & Higham Masonry, a sub-contractor on the
project.
3.

Id»
Defendant Layton Construction Company was the general

contractor on the pr oject pursuant to a contract with the state of
•

Id.

4.

Defendant

subcontract

* *

wor l« " on !»•

,

Hundred
5.
paid

Construction, had

Harv & Hi ghaut Masonry

;

ul idi , hill tin1 < uiisKJ*1

Fifteen Thousand Dollars,

entered

perforin "all

i nto

a

masonry

M\ nt line Mill ion one

Id.

As a result of his accident, plaintiff claimed and was

worker's

Compensation Act
6.

Layton

compensate on

bene?.-

;h's

Worker's

(R. 14 2) ,

The State of Nevada was the owner of tl le $1 7 million

• - ar construction project and entered into a contract wi th the
General Contractor, Layton Construction Company.

5

(R. 14 0 ) ,

7.

All of the alleged acts which give rise to plaintiff's

tort cause of action occurred exclusively at Ely, Nevada.
8.

(R. 13) .

Plaintiff purposefully chose to work for Harv & Higham in

Nevada even though he could have worked for that company in Salt
Lake City, Ogden, or Orem, Utah.
9.

By working in Nevada rather than Utah, plaintiff received

substantially more money.
10.

(R. 378).

In order to earn this higher income, plaintiff joined a

Nevada union in Reno, Nevada.
11.
and

its

(R. 377).

(R. 378).

In each subcontract entered between Layton Construction
subcontractors,

Layton

Construction

required

all

subcontractors to provide worker's compensation insurance for their
employees while working in the State of Nevada.

(R. 45), 50 and

55) .
12.

At least one of the subcontractors at the project, Bilt-

Rite Concrete, Inc., was a Nevada company.

(R. 40, 106).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff filed his complaint in Utah as a tort cause of
action for personal injuries he received while working in Nevada.
Utah courts apply the doctrine of Lex Loci Delicti in determining
which state's laws should apply to plaintiff's accident.

Under

that doctrine, Nevada law bars plaintiff's suit because Layton
6

Construction
thereforef

Company

Is c o n s i d e r e d

h i s statutory

employer and,

is immune from s u i t .

I Jt.ili

I'M ii

Ii

U M

e m p l o y e e s hircMi in Utah ljuf

mipML-.ii I IDII

a I

injured out at

Inn In

orovides

state a r e entitjea to

r e c e i v e " c o m p e n s a t i o n " u n d e r U t a h l a w , a o p l i e s only
compensation benefits.

+"hat

to w

-

3

That statutory provision, however, does not

c r e a t e a riqht for the e m p l o y e e t o m a i n t a i n c o m m o n - l a w t o r t a c t i o n
against his employer.
Even

if this c o u r t w ^ r ^ ^^> ^dopt- niair»t-iffe

c o n t a c t s " o r " i n t e r e s t s " approach
jn

this case, i\.
i™ Nevada.

injuries

-. . -

leave

. -

t

importantly
] :

\.n

negligent

. Nevada.

ana t

r "

act caus„

The plaintiff

* <- <r.^ ^ w? N^- *d • -1

purposefully

* h^ <•.'-•.

* * -

Additionally

.*

a

state

, ,

subcontractors

Nevada.
» ; -3
: <3

(

r\ost s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t a c t s

:re

1

penitent:3

••

v

^n^t* :'-t:--*n

;

t

i those

Nevada v. -irr. r u ^ e none")

< '

Company

z

* * «•
lleged

occurred

~:\ *•«.-.

t:.* ri-\* . . * '. on . i b e • :,*

*

occurred

"substantial

m

. **

applied.

7

nterest

-^.einq 3* ~r i i A ;

Finally, plaintiff has inappropriately raised a constitutional
issue. This issue, however, is precluded by the general rule that
constitutional equal protection issues raised for the first time on
appeal cannot be considered by the appellate court unless they
pertain to a person's loss of liberty. As such, this court cannot
consider plaintiff's equal protection argument.
ARGUMENT
I.

BECAUSE UTAH APPLIES THE RULE OF LEX LOCI
DELICTI,
NEVADA
LAW
APPLIES
TO
PLAINTIFF'S TORT ACTION.

On December 28, 1990, plaintiff filed his complaint against
Layton Construction Company, alleging that Layton's Negligence
caused plaintiff to suffer personal injuries. Although plaintiff's
action was filed in Utah, the accident giving rise to the complaint
occurred in Nevada.

The issue, therefore, is which state's law

should apply to the plaintiff's cause of action.
In determining which state's law will apply, the conflict of
laws rules of the forum state are determinative. Klaxom v. Stentor
Electric Mfg. Co. . 313 U.S. 487, 491, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477
(1941) .

As this case was filed in Utah, Utah's conflict of law

rules apply.

See Buhler v. Maddison, 176 P.2d 118, 109 Utah 267

(1947) .
When faced with a tort claim where the injury occurs outside
the state, Utah courts apply the law of the state of injury,
8

otherwise known as the rule of lex loci delicti.

Madison v.

Deseret Livestock Co. , 574 F.2d 1027 (10th Cir. 1978); Valasouez v.
Greyhound

Lines, Inc., 366 P.2d

989, 12 Utah 2d 379

(overruled on other grounds) (671 P.2d 217).

(1961)

Under the lex loci

doctrine, the forum state will apply the law of the state of the
injury to determine plaintiff's ability to maintain his tort suit.
Accordingly, as the accident occurred in Nevada, plaintiff's claim
for personal injuries in this matter is governed by Nevada law.
Under

Nevada

law, employers

are

immune

from

common-law

liability for injuries suffered by their employees arising out of
and in the course of employment. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616.270 (1986).
(attached as Exhibit "A").

Nevada law also provides that all

subcontractors and their employees are deemed to be employees of
the principal contractor.
(attached

as

Exhibit

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616.085 (Supp. 1989)

"B").

Accordingly,

under

Nevada

law,

plaintiff is deemed to be an employee of Layton Construction, the
general contractor.

Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Eighth

Judicial Dist. Court, 349 P.2d 444, 76 Nev. 72 (I960).1 Therefore,
1

Although Nevada law provides an exception to this rule in
the case of employees hired outside of the state who are
temporarily within the state, this exception does not
apply to employees of a contractor on a project whose
cost as a whole exceeds $250,000. Nevada Revised Statute
§ 616.260(1); 616.260(3) (attached as Exhibit MCff) .
Because the cost of the construction project in Nevada
was approximately $17,000,000, this exception does not
apply.
9

as the employer of plaintiff, Layton Construction is shielded from
common-law

tort

liability

for

plaintiff's

personal

injuries

incurred in the course and scope of his employment.
II.

THE LEX LOCI DELICTI RULE FOLLOWED BY
UTAH COURTS IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE
PROVISION OF UTAH'S WORKER'S COMPENSATION
ACT WHICH ALLOWS AN EMPLOYEE TO OBTAIN
"COMPENSATION" FOR HIS OUT-OF-STATE
INJURY.

In order to avoid the effect of Utah's adherence to the rule
of lex loci delicti, plaintiff has repeatedly attempted to recast
the issue in this case as being a worker's compensation conflict of
law question. Although probably irrelevant, plaintiff has gone so
far as to misstate in his Statement of Facts that he filed this
action for negligence "pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated, Section 35-1-62 [attached as Exhibit "D"] ... to recover
damages from negligent third parties including the defendants."
Compare Appellant's Brief at p. 7 with R. 2-7, 12-18.

Plaintiff

clearly did not mention the statute in his pleadings.
Plaintiff now argues that Section 35-1-54 of the Utah's
Worker's Compensation Act allows him to maintain a negligence claim
against defendants by statutory exception to the general rule of
Lex Loci Delicti.

That section provides:

If an employee who has been hired or is
regularly employed in this state, receives
personal injury by accident arising out of and
in the course of such employment outside of
10

the state, he, or his dependents, in case of
his death, shall be entitled to compensation
according to the law of this state•
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-54 (emphasis added) (attached as Exhibit
"E") .

Plaintiff's assertion, however, depends on too broad of

reading of that Section.
Section 35-1-54 addresses the issue of what law will govern an
injured party's entitlement to worker's "compensation" benefits.
It requires, as to a Utah employee, that Utah law governs the
entitlement to worker's compensation benefits, regardless of the
state in which he or she is injured. This makes sense; Utah has a
legitimate interest in assuring that Utah workers, who are injured
out of state, will receive at least the minimum statutory support
guaranteed by Utah law.

After all, such workers will presumably

return to Utah to live and must be assured that they receive
compensation for their work related injuries in light of the cost
of living in Utah.
The issue in this case, however, is not whether sufficient
compensation benefits will be provided to the injured worker.
After all, plaintiff has already received such benefits pursuant to
Utah's Worker's Compensation Act.

(R. 146).

Rather, the issue

here is whether Nevada law allows plaintiff to maintain his commonlaw tort claim.

Section 35-1-54, however, has no impact on this

latter issue.
11

This conclusion is clear from the definition given the term
"compensation" in Section 3 5-1-44 of the Utah Worker's Compensation
Code.

That

statute

defines

the

term

"compensation"

payments and benefits provided for in this title."
§ 35-1-44

(attached as Exhibit " F " ) .

as

"the

Utah Code Ann.

This definition clearly

indicates that the term "compensation," as used in Section 35-1-54,
refers only to entitlement to Worker's Compensation benefits and
rate of compensation.
To avoid this straightforward reading of the statute, plaintiff has cited a Wyoming case and the model Worker's Compensation
Act to support his argument that "compensation" and "benefits"
includes the right to maintain a common-law tort action.

However,

when faced with this identical argument, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that "benefits" under the
Worker's Compensation Act could not sensibly be interpreted to
include a common-law tort action. Woodner v. Mather. 210 F.2d 868,
871-72 (D.C. Cir. 1954).

Similarly, Section 35-1-54 only addresses

the issue of what state's law will apply to an injured party's
worker's compensation benefits.

It does not have any impact on the

pivotal issue of what tort law a Utah court will apply when the
injury occurred out of its jurisdiction.

That issue, as explained

above, is governed by the rule of lex loci delicti.

12

This

interpretation

compensation law.

also

squares with

Nevada's worker's

Nevada specifically recognizes other states'

interests in regulating the worker's compensation benefits for outof-state employees injured in Nevada. Section 616.2 60 of Nevada's
Revised Statues exempts non-residents from the provisions of the
Nevada worker's compensation laws if the employer has furnished
worker's compensation insurance under the applicable law of the
other state.

See § 616.260 (attached as Exhibit "C").

However,

Section 616.085, which defines "employee" for the purpose of
immunity from civil liability, contains no exception for injuries
involving out-of-state employees.
Exhibit "B").

See § 616.085 attached as

These provisions reflect an assumption on the part

of the drafters of the statute that Nevada law should not apply to
worker's compensation benefits payable to out-of-state employees,
but should apply to the employee's general tort remedy.
Moreover,

Nevada

law

contains

an

exception

to

extra-

territorial application of another state's worker's compensation
law.

That

exception,

contained

in

Nevada

Review

Statute,

§ 616.260(3) provides that another state's worker's compensation
law shall not apply to employees of a contractor on a project whose
cost as a whole exceeds $250,000. This exception clearly makes the
exclusive remedy provision of Nevada's worker's compensation law
apply to all employees injured in the state of Nevada on major
13

projects, regardless of the state of domicile of the employee. The
exception applies here where the cost of the project exceeded $17
million.
The plaintiff's interpretation of Utah's statute, on the other
hand, not only requires too broad of reading of Section 35-1-54,
but also makes no sense in terms of policy. Under the plaintiff's
interpretation, a Nevada contractor's immunity from suit would
depend upon the state in which the injured party was hired.

For

example, there is no question that a Nevada contractor who hires
all Nevada subcontractors would be immune from suit by a subcontractor's employee for a work related injury.

However, under

the plaintiff's reading of the law, a Nevada contractor who hired
a Utah subcontractor would lose that immunity regarding injuries
suffered by the Utah subcontractor's employees.

Presumably, the

situation would be the same as to subcontractors having employees
from other states with statutory provisions similar to Utah's.
Clearly, neither Utah nor Nevada law could have intended this
result.
create

In fact, the likely impact of such a scenario would
a

huge

disincentive

for

Nevada

contractors

to

hire

subcontractors from Utah.
Furthermore, plaintiff's reliance on Allen v. Industrial
Commission, 110 Utah 328, 172 P.2d 669 (1946), is misplaced. That
court merely addressed the issue of whether the Utah Industrial
14

Commission had jurisdiction to award compensation benefits to an
employee hired in the state of Utah whose injury was sustained in
another state.

The Allen court held that the Utah Industrial

Commission does have jurisdiction in such a case.

Allen did not

involve the issue of which state's law would govern the injured
party's tort claim.
Additionally, Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., 752 P. 2d 1363 (Wyo.
1988), is similarly inapplicable.

In Mapco, the choice of law

provisions of the two states concerned (Colorado and Wyoming) were
different from the choice of law provisions at issue here.

The

Wyoming statute, found controlling in Mapco, was much broader than
Utah's statute, Section 35-1-54.

The Wyoming statute's was not

confined to "compensation"2 as defined in Utah's act.

The Mapco

2

That statute provided: If an employee, while working outside
of the territorial limits of this state, suffers an injury on
account of which he, or in the event of his death, his dependents,
would have been entitled to the benefits provided by this act [§§
27-12-101 through 27-12-804] had the injury occurred within this
state, the employee, or in the event of his death, resulting from
the injury, his dependents, are entitled to the benefits provided
by this act, if at the time of the injury:
(i) His employment is principally localized in this
state;
(ii) He is working under a contract of hire made in this
state in employment not principally localized in any
state; or
(iii) He is working under a contract of hire made in
this state in employment principally localized in another
state whose worker's compensation law is not applicable
15

court interpreted

its act to encompass not only the rate of

compensation, but the statutory

immunity provisions as well.

Because Utah's statute is much narrower, Mapco has no application.
III.

THE SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS TEST SUGGESTED
BY PLAINTIFF WOULD PRODUCE THE SAME
RESULTS.

Authorities

relied

upon

by

plaintiff

represent

the

"significant contacts" or "interest" approach used by some courts.
That rule is set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of
Laws, Section 145(2) as follows:
(1)

The place where the injury occurred;

(2)

The place where the conduct causing the

injury occurred;
(3)

The

domicile,

residence,

nationality,

place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties, and
(4) The place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered.
Under the facts of the present matter, and as previously
detailed, it is conceded that the first two factors (place of
injury and place of conduct) were located in Nevada.

to his employer.
§ 27-12-208(a) Wyo. Stat. (Supp. 1983).
16

The third

factor (domicile or place of business of parties) is plaintiff's
only argument.

However, the place where the relationship of the

parties at the time of the accident was centered was clearly in
Nevada.

Moreover, not all the parties were Utah companies.

At

least one of the parties to this action, Bilt-Rite Concrete, Inc.,
is a Nevada company.

The fourth factor, the place where the

parties7 relationship is centered, clearly also is State of Nevada.
Therefore, even under the significant contacts approach, Nevada
clearly has a stronger relationship to this accident than does the
State of Utah.
the project.

Furthermore, the State of Nevada is the owner of
A more compelling reason to apply Nevada law can

hardly be imagined.
Under the "contacts" or "interests" approach, Nevada worker's
compensation law should apply to determine the extent of the
worker's

compensation

exclusive

remedy.

This

was

the same

conclusion reached by the Nevada Supreme Court in Tab Construction
Co. v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 83 Nev. 364, 432 P.2d 90
(1967). In that case, the employee of an Arizona subcontractor was
injured on a construction project in Nevada.

He brought a civil

action against the Nevada general contractor and several of its
employees.

Under Arizona law, like Utah law, such a suit was

allowed. Nevada law, however, barred such claims.

The Nevada

Supreme Court held that Nevada law would apply to bar the suit.
17

The following factors, among others, were key to the Court's
decision:

The general contractor on the project was a Nevada

resident, his business was localized

in Nevada, the alleged

negligent act and the injury occurred in Nevada. Based in part on
these factors, the Court observed that, "the State of Nevada has a
legitimate constitutional

interest

in application of

its own

domestic law and policy to a work injury occurring within its
borders."

Tab Construction, 432 P.2d at 91.

In the case at bar, although the general contractor is not a
resident of Nevada, Nevada was the owner of the project. (R. 140) .
If the State of Nevada does not have a sufficient interest in
having its own law apply to a state owned prison project then it is
hard to imagine who does.

Furthermore, both the alleged negligent

act and the injury occurred in Nevada. Also, plaintiff's presence
in Nevada was not a fortuitous circumstance, such as being involved
in an automobile accident while driving through the state. Here,
plaintiff purposefully took advantage of Nevada's benefits: First,
plaintiff chose to work for Harv & Higham in Nevada even though he
could have worked for that company in Salt Lake City, Ogden, or
Orem, Utah. See R. 377. Second, plaintiff received substantially
more money by working in Nevada rather than Utah.

See R. 378.

Finally, plaintiff joined a Nevada union in Reno, Nevada, in order
to earn this higher income.

Id. In sum, plaintiff purposefully
18

availed himself of Nevada's benefits, he then came home to Utah to
collect worker's compensation benefits and now wants to maintain an
action in Utah's courts to further compensate him for his Nevada
injury.
Based on the foregoing facts, it is clear that even if this
court chooses to adopt plaintiff's

"substantial

contacts" or

"interests" rule, that Nevada, not Utah, has the most substantial
interests in seeing that Nevada law applies.

As noted earlier, a

contrary conclusion would erect a serious impediment to Utah
companies and employees who want to work in Nevada.

Nevada

companies would be unlikely to hire Utah companies (and their
employees) because those employees could make an end-run around
Nevada's worker's compensation law by collecting benefits in Utah
and then suing the general contractors and other subcontractors in
Utah.

Clearly this was not the intent of the Utah legislature.
IV.
In

his

PLAINTIFF HAS INAPPROPRIATELY ARGUED A
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE.
opposing

memorandum,

plaintiff

has

argued

that

"[ajlthough no constitutional issues were raised before the trial
court, the denial of Shaw's right to bring and maintain this
lawsuit may

constitute

a violation

of

the

Equal

Protection

provisions of both the United States and Utah Constitutions."
Appellant's Brief at 21.

Plaintiff, however, failed to raise the
19

issue in the lower court and has completely failed to adequately
brief this issue on appeal or to include it as an issue in his
brief.

As such, this court cannot reach this issue on appeal.

See

State v. Yates, 189 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Utah
Rules App. P r o c , Rule 24(a)(9).

Moreover, if

constitutional

issues are not raised before its lower court, an appellant cannot
raise them on appeal unless a person's liberty is at stake.
v. City of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172 (Utah 1981).

Pratt

Nevertheless, on

the merits, appellant has not raised a legitimate constitutional
issue.

That is, under either state's law, all employees from Utah

are treated similarly.

Thus, there is no equal protection issue.

Should this court decide to entertain this issue, however, appellee
requests that it be allowed to further address this question.
CONCLUSION
Utah

adheres

to

the

lex

loci

delicti

plaintiff's tort claim is barred by Nevada law.
allowed

under Utah's

statute, refers

rule.

As

such,

"Compensation," as

to worker's

compensation

benefits and not the right to maintain a common-law tort action.
However,

even

if

this

court

adopts

plaintiff's

"significant

contacts" or "interests" approach, Nevada law should be applied
because of the numerous contacts and interests tied to Nevada.
As a matter of policy, plaintiff's position would do Utahan's
a serious disservice.

Nevada companies would avoid hiring Utah
20

subcontractors due to the risk of being sued.

Also, although

plaintiff's proffered solution would seem to allow the greatest
rights to injured Utahans, this would not necessarily be true under
different facts.

For example, if plaintiff were injured through

his own fault and his immediate employer failed to provide worker's
compensation benefits and was financially defunct, plaintiff would
recover nothing under his approach.

In that situation, plaintiff

would likely argue that Nevada law should apply, which requires the
statutory employer to guarantee worker's compensation benefits.
Finally, Lex Loci provides a clearly understandable test which
parties can rely upon and would prevent forum shopping by parties
such as plaintiff.
DATED this ^ Z

day of October, 1993.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Layton Construction Company Inc.

21

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that 4 copies of the foregoing brief were mailed
first class mail, postage prepaid, this /Z^

day of October, 1993,

to the following:
Steven B. Wall
Cory R. Wall
WALL & WALL
Suite 800 Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Steven B. Smith
SCALLEY & READING
261 East 300 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Lae^C. Henning
David C. Richards

22

Exhibits

Exhibit A

616.270

LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATION.*

616.270

616.270. Employers to provide compensation: rei:-; ->om liability.
1. Every employer within the provisions of thi.^ chapter, and those
employers who shall accept the terms of this chapter and be governed by its
provisions, as in this chapter provided, shall provide and secure compensation
according to the terms, conditions and provisions of this chapter for any and
all personal injuries by accident sustained by an employee arising out of and
in the course of the employment.
2. Travel for which an employee receives wages shall, for the purposes of
this chapter, be deemed in the course of employment.
3. In such cases the employer shall be relieved from other liability for
recovery of damages or other compensation for such personal injury, unless by
the terms of this chapter otherwise provided. (1947, p. 572; CL 1929 (1949
Supp.), § 2680.26; 1971, p. 2058.)
CASE NOTES
I.
II.
III.
IV.

General Consideration.
Injury Arising Out of and In Course of Employment.
Exclusivity of Act.
Provision of Coverage by Employer.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Cited in: Simon Serv. Inc. v. Mitchell, 73
Nev. 9. 307 P.2d 110 (1957); Tab Constr. Co. v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 83 Nev. 364. 432
P.2d 90 (1967); Heitman v. Bank of Las Vegas,
87 Nev. 201, 484 P.2d 572 (1971); Nevada
Indus. Comm'n v. Reese. 93 Nev. 115. 560 P.2d
1352 (1977i; Spencer v. Harrah's Inc.. 9S Nev.
99, 641 P.2d 481 (1952); Lewis v. United
States. 680 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 19821.
II. INJURY ARISING OUT OF AND IN
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.
Negligence of fellow employee. — When
an employee is injured on the job as a result of
the negligence of a fellow employee, his remedy is compensation under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act. Leslie v. J.A. Tiberti
Constr. Co., 99 Nev. 494. 664 P.2d 963 (1983).
Assault while at work. — Where an employee is assaulted and injury is inflicted upon
him through animosity and ill will arising
from some cause wholly disconnected with the
employer's business or the employment, the
employee cannot recover compensation simply
because he is assaulted when he is in the
discharge of his duties. Under such circumstances, the injury* does not arise out of the
course of employment, and the employment is
not the cause of the injury, althoueh it may be
the occasion of the willful act and may furnish
the opportunity for its execution. McColl v.
Scherer. 73 Nev. 226. 315 P.2d 807 11957).

Assault by insane coemployee. — Employee's death, as a matter of law. arose out of
the employment, where he was assaulted in
the course of his employment by an insane
fellow emplovee. Cummines v. United Resort
Hotels. Inc., 85 Nev. 23. 449 P 2d 245 (1969).
Shooting of employee. — In a personal
injury action brought against a ciub owner by
a waitress who was snot by a customer while
on dutv. summary juaernent for the employer
on CTounds that she was covered by the Industrial Insurance Act was improper, where there
was no determination as to whetner her injury
resulted from beinc placed in a position of
dancer by reason of her employment or was the
result of enmity, gruaee. or other personal
relationship. McColl v. Scherer. 73 Nev. 226,
315 P.2d 807 (1957).
Recreational activity. — Recreational activity snould not be deemed to be within the
course of employment unless it is a regular
incident of employment, or is required bv the
employer, or is of direct benefit to the employei
beyond the intangible value of employe*
health and morale common to all kinds o
recreation and social life; thus, where it wa.'
not a regular incident of employee's employ
ment to enjoy recreation on his day off at gol
driving range, and his employer did not re
quire his presence there, nor did the employe
receive a direct benefit from that off-dut;
activity beyond the intangible value of em
ployee health and morale common to all kind
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Exhibit B

616.084

LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

616.085

C r o s s r e f e r e n c e s . — As to determination of
disability for vocational rehabilitation, see
NRS 615.220.

616.084. "Employee": Volunteer workers at Nevada mental health
institute.
Volunteer workers at the Nevada mental health institute, while acting
under the direction or authorization of the supervisor of volunteer services of
the mental health institute, shall be deemed, for the purpose of this chapter,
employees of the Nevada mental health institute in the mental hygiene and
mental retardation division .of the department of human resources, receiving a
wage of S350 per month, and shall be entitled to the benefits of this chapter
upon compliance therewith by the Nevada mental health institute. (1969, p.
236; 1973, pp. 118,1406.)
C r o s s r e f e r e n c e s . — As to labor by clients
of mental health centers, see NRS 433.524.

616.085. "Employee": Subcontractors and employees.
Subcontractors and their employees shall be deemed to be employees of the
principal contractor. (1947, p. 571; 1951, p. 485.)
CASE NOTES
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . — This section and NRS
616.115 neither compel an employee to labor
against his will, for the benefit of another, nor
prohibit or restrict any employee from leaving
the service of the employer, and thus do not
violate the involuntary servitude provisions of
either the federal or state Constitutions.
Cavagnaro v. State Wide Investigations, Inc.,
94 Nev. 467, 581 P.2d 859 (1978). "
Nevada's Industrial Insurance Act is
u n i q u e l y different from the industrial insurance acts of other states in that independent
contractors and subcontractors by NRS
616.115 and this section are accorded the
status of emplovees. Noland v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 97 Nev. 268. 628 P.2d 1123 H981).
P u r p o s e . — The purpose of this section is,
at least in part, to protect the employees of
subcontractors
against
the
possible
irresponsibility of their immediate employers,
by making the principal contractor or principal
employer having general control of the construction liable as if he had directly employed
every worker on the job. Simon Serv. Inc. v.
Mitchell, 73 Nev. 9, 307 P.2d 110 (1957).
In order to make the determination of
which types of subcontractors and independent contractors are covered and thus

immune from liability, it is necessary to make
an initial determination as to the statutory
employer; the type of work performed by the
subcontractor or independent contractor will
determine whether the employer is the statutory employer. Meers v. Haughton Elevator, —
Nev.— .'701 P.2d 1006 • 1985).
O w n e r w h o a c t s a s g e n e r a l c o n t r a c t o r or
principal e m p l o y e r . — The 1951 amendment
to this section, which deleted "or other person
having the work done" from the end thereof,
eliminated an owner whose only status was as
owner, but who might be said, as such owner,
to be the person having the work done. However, when that owner assumed the additional
status of being principal employer or principal
contractor, he was not eliminated just because
he was also the owner. Simon v. Serv. Inc. v.
Mitchell. 73 Nev. 9, 307 P.2d 110 (1957).
Where a defendant owner, in constructing a
building, entered into separate contracts, the
fact that defendant was a general contractor or
principal employer would preclude an employee of another contractor who suffered injuries in the course of his employment and
accepted benefits under the Industrial Insurance Act from recovenng at common law from
defendant for the injuries sustained. Titanium
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Exhibit C

616.255

INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE

616.260

SCOPE AND OPERATION

616.255. Applicability to interstate commerce and certain plans for
benefits in effect before July 1, 1947.
LEGAL PERIODICALS
Review of Selected Nevada Legislation,
Health and Welfare, 1987 Pac. L.J. Rev. Nev.
Legis. 117.

616.256. Plans for benefits in effect before July 1, 1947: Determination
of sufficiency; applicability of chapter.
LEGAL PERIODICALS
Review of Selected Nevada Legislation,
Health and Welfare, 1987 Pac. L.J. Rev. Nev.
Legis. 117.

616.260. Exemption of employer and employee temporarily within
state; exception; effect of employee working in another
state where coverage required.
I 1. Except as limited in subsection 3, any employee who has been hired
I outside of this state and his employer are exempted from the provisions of this
I chapter while the employee is temporarily within this state doing work for his
| employer if his employer has furnished industrial insurance coverage under
• the industrial insurance act or similar laws of a state other than Nevada so as
i.to cover the employee's employment while in this state, provided;
(a) The extraterritorial provisions of this chapter are recognized in the
j^other state; and
/ (b) Employers and employees who are covered in this state are likewise
/ exempted from the application of the industrial insurance act or similar
C l a w s of the other state.
The benefits under the industrial insurance act or similar laws of the other
state are the exclusive remedy against the employer for any injury, whether
resulting in death or not, received by the employee while working for the
employer in this state.
2. A certificate from the administrator or similar officer of another state
certifying that the employer of the other state is insured therein and has
provided extraterritorial coverage insuring his employees while working
within this state is prima facie evidence that the employer carried the industrial insurance.
| ^ 3. The exemption provided for in this section does not apply to the em\ ployees of a contractor, as defined in NRS 624.020, operating within the scope
\jmj){ his license on a project whose cost as a whole exceeds $250,000.
4. An employer is not required to pay premiums to the system for an employee who has been hired or is regularly employed in this state, but who is
69
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616.263

LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIG

616.265

performing work exclusively in another state, if the other state requires the
employer to provide coverage for the employee in the other state. If the employee receives personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
his employment, any claim for compensation must be filed in the state in
which the accident occurred, and such compensation is the exclusive remedy
of the employee or his dependents. This subsection does not prevent an employer from maintaining coverage for the employee under the provisions of
this chapter. (1947, p. 594: 1955, p. 187; 1981, p. 1464; 1989. ch. 276, § 1, p.
578; 1989, ch. 325, § 1, p. 682.1
Editor's note. — This section was amended
by two 1989 acts which do not appear to conflict and have been compiled together.
Effective date. — Acts 1989, ch. 276. § 1
became effective October 1, 1989. Acts 1989.
ch. 325, § 1, became effective June 13, 1989,
pursuant to ch. 325, § 2.
Effect of amendment. — The 1989 amend-

ment by ch. 276, § 1. as amended by ch. 325,
§ 1, in the introductory paragraph of subsection 1, added "Except as limited in subsection
3" at the beginning of the paragraph: added
the present subdivision ltai and redesignated
the former subdivisions lia* and Kb) as the
present subdivisions Kb) and l(o, respectively,
and added subsections 3 and 4.

616.263. Real estate broker or salesman who hires independent contractor not considered employer.
Any person licensed pursuant to the provisions of chapter 645 of NRS who
engages an independent contractor to maintain or repair property on behalf of
an individual property owner or an association of property owners is not a
statutory employer for the purposes of this chapter. (1987, ch. 199, § 4, p.
450.)
LEGAL PERIODICALS
Review of Selected Nevada Legislation,
Worker's Compensation, 19S7 Pac. L.J. Rev.
Nev. Legis. 219.

616.265. Devices modifying liability void; exception.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2:
(a) A contract of employment, insurance, relief benefit, indemnity, or any
other device, does not modify, change or waive any liability created by this
chapter.
(b) A contract of employment, insurance, relief benefit, indemnity, or any
other device, having for its purpose the waiver or modification of the terms
or liability created by this chapter is void.
2. Nothing in this section prevents an owner or lessor of real property from
requiring an employer who is leasing the real property from agreeing to insure the owner or lessor of the property against any liability for repair or
maintenance of the premises. (1947, p. 572; CL 1929 (1949 Supp.), § 2680.25;
1989, ch. 582, § 1, p. 1245.)
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Exhibit D

35-1-62

LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of persons other t h a n employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer — Rights of employer or
insurance carrier in cause of action — Maintenance of action — Notice of intention to proceed
against third party — Right to maintain action
not involving employee-employer relationship —
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery.
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other
than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an
action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and
the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal
representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not
settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission.
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or
other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding.
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Section 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contractors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased
employee at the time of his injury or death.
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as
follows:
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees,
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their
interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third
party.
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1).
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation.
Historv: L. 1917, ch. 100, $ 72; C.L. 1917, L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1971, ch. 76, $ 3; 1973.
§ 3133; L 1921, ch. 100, $ 1; R.S. 1933, ch. 67, $ 7; 1975, ch. 101, $ 3.
42-1-58; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-58;
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35-1-54

LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

35-1-54. Employee injured outside state — Entitled to compensation — Limitation of time.
If an employee who has been hired or is regularly employed in this state
receives personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of such
employment outside of this state, he, or his dependents in case of his death,
shall be entitled to compensation according to the law of this state. This
provision shall apply only to those injuries received by the employee within
six months after leaving this state, unless prior to the expiration of such six
months period the employer has filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah
notice that he has elected to extend such coverage a greater period of time.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 65; C.L. 1917,
§ 3126; R.S. 1933, 42-1-52; L. 1941, ch. 37,
§ 1; C. 1943, 42-1-52.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Employees of foreign corporation.
Foreign compensation laws.
Injuries in interstate commerce.
Operation and eilect.
Words and phrases defined.
Cited.
Employees of foreign corporation.
Since relation of employer and employee existed between foreign transportation company
and truck driver in this state at time of injury,
Industrial Commission had jurisdiction to
make award, and such power in nowise depended upon reading into his contract of employment the law of Colorado where the contract was made, for when employer sent his
employee into Utah to work for it there, it subjected itself to this chapter. Buckingham
Transp. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah
342, 72 P.2d 1077 (1937).
Employer or its insurance carrier are not required to make payments to injury benefit fund
where airline stewardess, employed in California by employer with its principal offices in
California, is killed in course of temporary employment in Utah leaving no surviving dependents. United Air Lines Transp. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 110 Utah 590, 175 P.2d 752
(1946).
Foreign compensation laws.
In action by employee for personal injuries
arising in state of Wyoming, defense that Wyoming had adopted Workmen's Compensation
Act, and that such act furnished adequate and
exclusive remedy to employee to recover compensation, was sustained. Bozo v. Central Coal
& Coke Co., 54 Utah 289. ISO P. 432 (1919).
Resident employee who was injured in

course of employment in another state was entitled to compensation for such injuries, although employer was insured under laws of
other state. Pickering v. Industrial Commn. 59
Utah 35, 201 P. 1029 (1921).
In the absence of proof it will be presumed
that the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of another state are the same as
those of the forum. Shurtliflf v. Oregon Short
Line R.R., 66 Utah 161, 241 P. 1058 (1925).
Injuries in interstate commerce.
Industrial Commission had power to make
award under this section for injury to trucker
employed by foreign corporation under foreign
contract notwithstanding that trucker was in
interstate commerce when injured. Buckingham Transp. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 93
Utah 342, 72 P.2d 1077 (1937).
Operation and effect.
If employer-employee relationship is maintained in this state. Industrial Commission has
jurisdiction to make an award notwithstanding
that original contract of employment was entered into in foreign state and that injury occurred in foreign state. Fav v. Industrial
Comm'n, 100 Utah 542, 114 P.2d 508 (1941).
Commission had right to award compensation for death of salesman occurring in Idaho,
under first sentence of this section, notwithstanding that original contract of employment

184

Exhibit F

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Educ. of Alpine School Dist. v. Olsen, 684 P.2d
49 (Utah 1984).
Welfare or relief recipients.
Under voluntary arrangement between two
state agencies, state fair association and public
welfare department, pursuant to latter's plan
to compel welfare recipients who were able to
work to work out their relief payments on certain projects, whereby such recipients were directed to report to association for work and
were placed by latter under supervision and
control of its superintendent of fairgrounds at
work having substantial economic value to as-

35-1-44

sociation, recipient was "employee," association was "employer" and "contract of hire" existed within meaning of this section, as
amended in 1945, so as to entitle injured recipient to compensation, where association was
required by welfare commission to furnish
compensation insurance for such workers, and
had right to hire, fire, control, supervise and
regulate pay of them, although payment of
compensation and relief payments were made
by welfare board. Commission of Fin. v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 73, 191 P.2d 598
(1948).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 59 et seq.

Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
<*= 230.

35-1-44L Definition of terms.
The following terms as used in this title shall be construed as follows:
(1) "Order" shall mean and include any decision, rule, regulation, direction, requirement or standard of the commission, or any other determination arrived at, or decision made, by such commission.
(2) "General order" shall mean and include an order applying generally throughout the state to all persons, employments or places of employment of a class under the jurisdiction of the commission. All other orders
of the commission shall be considered special orders.
(3) "Welfare" shall mean and include comfort, decency and moral wellbeing.
(4) "Safe" and "safety," as applied to any employment or place of employment, shall mean such freedom from danger to the life, health or
welfare of employees as the nature of the employment will reasonably
permit.
(5) "Personal injury by accident arising out of or in the course of employment" shall include any injury caused by the willful act of a third
person directed against an employee because of his employment. It shall
not include a disease, except as it shall result from the injury.
(6) "Compensation" shall mean the payments and benefits provided for
in this title.
(7) "Award" shall mean the finding or decision of the commission as to
the amount of compensation due any injured, or the dependents of any
deceased, employee.
(8) "Average weekly earnings" shall mean the average weekly earnings arrived at by the rules provided in Section 35-1-75.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 52; C.L. 1917,
§ 3112; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 42-1-42.
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